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3 Bridging the gap between sociology and 
communication science
Communication as social action
Friedrich Krotz*
This chapter describes and discusses how communication science became a so-
cial science by taking over research methods mainly from sociology and by un-
derstanding communication no longer as transport of information but as a form 
of social action. Based hereon, the chapter describes the commonalities and the 
different perspectives of sociology and communication science on communica-
tion and media. In spite of the fact that communication science adopted a lot of 
sociological theories—for example, from Adorno and Horkheimer or Habermas
—both disciplines have different views on communication; sociology as a means 
to organize society, communication science as a fundamental feature for being 
human. Thus, both disciplines are different, but can learn a lot from the other.
3.1 Introduction
As is well known, communication science started at the beginning of the 20th century 
(at least  in Germany) at  the universities as journalism and newspaper studies.  Since 
then, it has become a discipline in the academic field in its own right. For rather a long 
time communication science conceptualized communication as the transport of informa-
tion. This was reflected in the famous sequence of questions Harold Lasswell (1948) 
used to describe the discipline: Who says what to whom by which channel and with 
which effect? This transport concept may have been helpful in those days, but is not 
really adequate to understand the role of communication in the media rich societies of 
today, as will be seen in this chapter.
It was an important contribution to communication science, when Karsten Renck-
storf and others in the 1960s and 1970s created an understanding of media use or medi-
ated communication as social action and started to develop a theory thereon. This view 
should be understood as a different and independent approach from the former concept 
of communication as the transport of information, as we will argue below. It creates a 
different theory. In addition, as social action is a sociological category, this poses at least 
two new questions: What then is the difference between sociology and communication 
science? And, what concept of communication as social action does the study of the me-
diatised societies of today need for analysis to be fruitful? 
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To understand these developments and their importance for communication science 
and to answer these questions, it is necessary to tie up the discussions of the last century 
without  blurring  the  differences  between  sociology  and  communication  science.  Of 
course, life is different today: we live in a media rich society, in mediatised and global-
ised cultures in which identity and everyday life, socialization and social relations can-
not be understood without taking the media into account. Thus it is not enough just to 
look back; instead, based on past discussions, new theoretical and empirical work is ne-
cessary. All of this, of course in short form, is the topic of this chapter.
In this chapter we develop these topics in five steps. First, in section 2, we will 
sketch the development of communication science before the emergence of communica-
tion as social action. Then, we will deal with communication after this ‘action theoreti-
cal  turn’ (section  3).  In  the  fourth  section,  we  will  emphasise  sociology's  view on 
communication to make clear that communication science and sociology are related, 
and at the same time fundamentally different. Section five will discuss communication 
concepts in the media rich societies of today. The sixth section finally deals with open 
questions.
3.2 Communication from the perspective of communication 
science in the first half of last century
Communication science in the first half of the 20th century was never concerned with 
all existing forms of communication, as it only studied mass communication. Mediated 
interpersonal  communication  like  using  the  telephone  or  writing  a  letter  was  never 
really a communication science topic. The study of face-to-face-communication took 
place only in the margins of this discipline, as all introductory books show (e.g., Malet-
zke, 1963; McQuail, 1996; Pürer, 2003). Instead, communication science started with 
the insight that mass communication was becoming more and more influential for soci-
ety and politics, for the economy and democracy, for education and also for the relation-
ship between governments and nations.  Every media research history tells about the 
growing importance of newspapers in the second half of the 19th century, which—for 
example,  in  Germany—resulted  in  an  emerging  ‘Zeitungswissenschaft’ (‘science  of 
newspapers’) at the universities in the first decades of the 20th century. In this context, 
sociologist Max Weber's 1911 demand that there should be a sociology of newspapers 
and their role in society and his desire for systematic empirical studies must be men-
tioned (something that was not done at that time) (see for these historical facts Pürer, 
2003, p. 35). Another precursor of the emerging discipline in Germany was Wolfgang 
Riepl, who already in 1913 published a book about the history of communication that 
had come to a conclusion that even today is not familiar to all communication scholars: 
the success of new media does not suppress and rule out the old media. In such a pro-
cess, the old ones will lose some functions and gain others—in the words of today, the 
development of the media must be described as an ongoing process of differentiation 
(Riepl, 1972), and not by fixed historical epochs. 
Of course, communication science, after starting as a newspaper oriented science, 
soon became broader, especially because of the emergence of cinema and radio, the lat-
ter of which at its beginning was synonymous with ‘broadcast’. Especially during the 
Second World War, the role of propaganda and, more generally, of the different possible 
media effects became central topics of research, as can be seen for example, in the work 
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of Paul F.  Lazersfeld in the contexts of the ‘American Soldier’ research project (cf. 
Stouffer et al., 1966). Thus, in and after the Second World War, a new phase of commu-
nication science began, as it became a social science by asking for empirical studies and 
by using measurement as a methodology. The methodology of communication research 
at that time was heavily influenced by behaviourism, as were psychology and other so-
cial sciences (Pürer, 2003).
In general then, we can characterize communication science at the beginning of the 
1950s by five relevant features:
• their mass media orientation (1), 
• a behaviourist understanding of media use (2), 
• a methodological understanding that empirical research consists of  measuring con-
tent, use and effects (3), 
• the idea that people using media should be understood as a collective but dispersed 
audience (4), a view that should be called an institutional view of media use and re-
ception, as it refers to the interests of communicators,
• and, a media centered approach in the sense that the audience was understood as a 
target (5) with media effects just happening, as it was ironically expressed in the hy-
podermic needle model of communication.
A version of communication science from this time can be found in Gerhard Maletzke's 
famous  Psychology of Mass Communication, which appeared in 1963 and which had 
been translated into a dozen other languages by the beginning of the 1980s.
3.3 Communication from the perspective of communication 
science after the action theoretical turn
The understanding of communication changed slowly in the 1950s and 1960s: Bauer 
(1960) discovered the obstinate audience; Klapper (1960) criticized media effects re-
search and pointed to its  failure.  And Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) reanalysed earlier 
studies and found that mass communication effects must be seen in the context of inter-
personal communication as intervening variable; they constructed the opinion leaders. 
The main theoretical assumption to overcome this crisis within communication science 
was the assumption that the audience is active, that it acts guided by motives in order to 
get gratifications by using a specific mass medium with a specific content. Thus, the 
uses and gratifications approach was born—this was the first action theoretical concept 
in mainstream communication science. It reduced human ‘activity’ to a specific measur-
able behaviour and at the same time reduced creativity to the selection of given TV or 
radio channels. Nevertheless, this was, compared with the list of typical features above, 
a new theoretical development to media-centrism (5), as media users were no longer 
seen only as targets, but as active beings with own motives. 
In general, we should understand the uses and gratifications approach as an econom-
ically based approach. The  spiritus rector of communication science of that time was 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, who also in other contexts spoke of human action “…whenever we 
combine into one unit a goal directed series of behaviour that ends in a fairly distin-
guishable consummatory move” (Lazarsfeld, 1959, p. 2), and he understood “[t]he study 
of buying as a paradigm for the empirical analysis of action” (Lazarsfeld & Rosenberg, 
1955, p. 392) (cf. also Krotz, 1983). Thus, communication as human action here was re-
duced to selecting specific content  for reading, listening or viewing from accessible 
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channels as it was conceptualized by Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1974). In Germany, 
Drabczynski's book (1982) was influential in this direction. Nevertheless, activity as se-
lectivity and action as motivated selection is a frequently used concept even today (cf. 
for a discussion also Hasebrink & Krotz, 1991). 
At this point it is important to remind ourselves that the uses and gratifications ap-
proach was not the only action theoretical communication model. It was, however, the 
only action theoretical communication model from mainstream communication science 
that was compatible with the above mentioned features (1), (2), (3) and (4): a mass me-
dia concept based on behaviourism, a measurable concept, still  reproducing a media 
centered view that understands people as the audience of a medium and not as persons 
living in their own social environment with their own inner reality. As Alan Rubin ex-
plained some decades later (1994), the uses and gratification approach was created to 
make media effects research better. The uses and gratifications approach thus was not 
really interested in what people do with the media, it was interested in the role of inter-
vening variables in making effects research better—at least in its basic conception. 
Besides this mainstream strain of communication science, another line of thinking 
about communication has always existed as a sociological theory: symbolic interaction-
ism. George Herbert Mead understood communication as symbolic interaction and thus 
as a practice by which human beings reproduce themselves in a specific historical and 
cultural way (Mead, 1969, 1973; Krotz, 2001). James Dewey in 1927 had already writ-
ten  a  book (Dewey,  2001)  opposing  Walter  Lippman's  proposal  to  install  an  elitist 
democracy in which only experts were allowed to decide on public  affairs.  Herbert 
Blumer did empirical research about media on that basis (Blumer 1933). The idea of 
parasocial interaction and parasocial relations was created by Horton, Wohl and Strauss. 
These are genuine symbolic interactionist concepts (Horton & Wohl, 1956; Horton & 
Strauss, 1957). Their approach was, of course, directed at explaining how the emotional 
engagement  of  radio  users  came  into  existence,  but  they  started  at  the  interaction 
concept of symbolic interactionism and understood media related communication as a 
modification of face-to-face-communication. As face-to-face-communication is a form 
of social interaction, they called media related communication  parasocial interaction 
and then studied parasocial relations—which depend on parasocial interaction—in the 
same way as social relations depend on social interaction and face-to-face-communica-
tion. (This, of course, especially in the uses and gratifications approach, was frequently 
misunderstood as these researchers did not make a difference between interaction and 
relation.) 
Thus, the symbolic interactionist understanding of communication (cf. Krotz, 2001) 
became an interesting model for communication science in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
reason therefore was that the scientific community of communication researchers exper-
ienced the narrowness of their leading paradigms, and thus broadened their theory and 
research to include the communication concept of symbolic interactionism. When we 
compare symbolic interactionism as an action theoretical approach of media and com-
munication research with the above listed five characteristic features of communication 
science and the uses and gratifications approach, the differences to uses and gratifica-
tions become evident: symbolic interactionism is the opposite of all five criteria men-
tioned  as  it  defines  communication  not  only as  mass  communication,  but  includes 
interpersonal  and face-to-face-communication and understands mediated communica-
tion as a development and modification of face-to-face-communication. In addition, the 
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symbolic interactionism model is non-behaviourist, as it refers to meaning and sense 
making processes of the actors. It is not media centered and does not adopt the above 
mentioned institutional view, seeing communication as rooted in everyday life. In addi-
tion, it is common knowledge that research in the tradition of symbolic interactionism 
cannot operate with measurement concepts (Wilson, 1973; Blumer, 1973; and for com-
munication research Krotz, 2005; Mikos, 2008). 
Both  action  theoretical  approaches,  the uses  and  gratifications  approach  and  the 
symbolic interactionism, became prominent in those years. For example, in Germany, 
there were two influential articles by Will Teichert (1972; 1973) and some books and ar-
ticles by Karsten Renckstorf (1973, 1977). They introduced both approaches, that of 
symbolic  interactionism and that  of  uses and gratifications,  which Renckstorf  in his 
early  articles  called  the  ‘Nutzenansatz’ (‘uses  approach’)  and  which  later  was  con-
sidered to be the name of a German version of the uses and gratifications approach. 
Today the work of both is still quoted, although a lot of misunderstandings still exist 
about the common features and about the differences of these approaches. For example, 
Bentele, Brosius and Jarren in their encyclopedia of communication and media research 
(2006, p. 200) write that the Nutzenansatz is just the same as the uses and gratifications 
approach. This also is the position of Pürer (2003). However, Hugger (2008) at first 
calls the Nutzenansatz the German adaption of the uses and gratifications approach, and 
then names three specific features of it:  its  rather hardcore behaviourist roots in the 
work of Lazarsfeld, the reference to needs as reasons, what people expect of media, and 
then,  astonishingly,  says  that  this  approach  refers  to  symbolic  interactionism.  Also 
Burkart (1995, p. 211 ff.) in his influential textbook constructs a difference between the 
Nutzenansatz and uses and gratifications: Firstly, he emphasizes that the Nutzenansatz 
adopts  a  perspective  on  media  use  that  is  contrary  to  every  effects  measurement; 
secondly, he says that it adopts the idea from the uses and gratifications approach that 
people use media in order to obtain gratifications, which means people act on the basis 
of specific needs. And thirdly, he says that the Nutzenansatz understands media use as a 
form of social action, which includes the idea that action is the basic object of social re-
search. 
Thus, at the beginning Renckstorf's Nutzenansatz contributed to a blurring of the 
central features of symbolic interactionism on the one hand and to the behaviourist, in-
stitutionally oriented and measurement related uses and gratifications approach on the 
other hand. In his later article of 1989, Renckstorf argues much more clearly and con-
structs the basics of his media use as social action approach. Here, he mainly refers to 
symbolic  interactionism and demarcates it  from the positivistic and behaviourist  ap-
proaches, but this did not reach the above quoted scholars (Renckstorf, 1989). 
In this publication of 1989, Renckstorf thus provided the approach with a clear theo-
retical background by referring to Max Weber's famous understanding of social action, 
which he defines as any human behaviour if, and in as far as it is guided by subjectively 
defined sense (Weber, 1978, p. 9). In consequence, the important contribution of Renck-
storf to communication science here is twofold. On the one hand, he defined communi-
cation as a form of human action in the sense of Weber and thus opened communication 
science to a new and fruitful discussion of what communication is, one that can refer to 
the sociological discussion about different action theoretical approaches. And, on the 
other hand, this makes clear that the uses and gratifications approach is nothing else 
then a behaviourist view of action that is independent of whether it is applied to media 
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or to anything else: activity from this point of view is more or less selection and nothing 
else is of interest. Thus, the conclusion should be that symbolic interactionism theory 
can provide communication science with a much broader (and, in my opinion, better) 
theory, as it does not confine activity to selection; this differentiates it from the uses and 
gratifications approach. 
Summing up, the uses and gratifications approach as an action theoretical approach 
in its classical form is a functionalistic approach that does not refer to the basic ‘sense’ 
and ‘meaning’ category of what is fundamental for social action in the sense of Weber. 
The advantage of such a definition is that it opens the uses and gratifications approach 
to the measurement methodology of quantitative research, which cannot grasp sense. 
However, it must be seen that this makes the concept fundamentally different to the in-
terpretative  methodology of  qualitative  research  used  by  Blumer  (1973)  or  Wilson 
(1973) and all other symbolic interactionists.
Nevertheless this difference was not clear for 1970s' communication science and 
later,  as it  was not  seen as a separating quality.  Unfortunately,  this unclear situation 
brought the discussion in communication science to an end, more or less at the end of 
the 1980s. The theoretical and empirical potential of the different approaches demand-
ing a clear analysis of the concepts and ideas used thus was not exploited; the difference 
remained unclear.
In Germany, some years later, Teichert left the field of communication research and 
turned to journalism. Renckstorf, as far as I see, did not make any attempt to integrate 
the symbolic interactionist parasocial interaction approach explicitly into his media use 
as social action approach, in spite of the fact that he referred to symbolic interactionism 
in a broad way. Some empirical studies by Renckstorf, Westerik, and colleagues referred 
to the media use as social action approach, but there was no ongoing general debate 
with theoretical goals. The action theoretical assumptions of the emerging cultural stud-
ies approach at that time, as it was still called at the beginning of the nineties (Morley, 
1996), would also have had potential to adapt the symbolic interactionist approach to 
communication science, but this discussion did not really take place. It may be that the 
end of this discussion was a consequence of the media developments of that time, the 
large scale growth of commercial TV and, of course, the emergence of the digital media. 
Thus, the conceptual and theoretical development of communication as social action 
did not go on, and even now the question remains open about the difference between so-
ciology and communication science.
3.4 Communication from the perspective of sociology
We start here with the following main thesis: In the 19th century, sociology in general 
was interested in communication only as a means and not as a topic of its own. The 
leading questions at that time were concerned with how society is possible and how it 
functions. The usual answer of that time was that the structure and development of soci-
ety was given by the economy and its organisation, and communication was seen only 
as a more or less helpful instrument used by people. In the 20th century the same is still 
true,  but at least some approaches go further: mainly the symbolic interactionism of 
George Herbert Mead (1969, 1973), the work of Jürgen Habermas (1987) and some re-
search that has its roots in the sociology of knowledge of Karl Mannheim (1980). Of 
course, we can sketch this only very roughly here. 
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Sociology started as  the science of  how society is  possible  and how it  was and 
should be organised. When we look at the so called classic authors of sociology, for ex-
ample, when we read Comte, Marx or Durkheim, in general, humans appear to be the 
only beings that are able to work and to transform nature, and as beings that are depend-
ent of those transformations to reproduce their material life (Kiss, 1973; Aron, 1979; 
Ritzer & Goodman, 2004). For example, Marx and Engels in the German Ideology ex-
plain: “Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or any-
thing else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as 
soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly 
producing their actual material life” (Marx & Engels, 2008).
As a consequence, in Marxist theory and in most sociological approaches of the 19th 
century, society is moulded by people's relations to the means of production, and all 
power appears to be based on that. The Marxist concept for all that is not material, for 
all that makes sense and that could be understood as meaning, was then ideology. The 
base – superstructure form which tries to explain human thought and experienced reality 
as a more or less one-sided mechanical consequence of basic relations and of class posi-
tion then became relevant for those relations to the means of production. Hence, com-
munication is to be analysed as a means of organising and coordinating the respective 
forms of work and society, and each empirical analysis then must include the ideologic-
al content of thinking and experiencing  and is mostly confined to that. Thus, sociology 
before the 20th century did not really have its own concept of communication and it had 
no real understanding of its role in society. The main concepts used by sociology to 
refer to communication have been language and interaction, but communication has not 
been analysed as a topic of its own. 
This changed, at least in specific approaches, in the 20th century. Max Weber, as 
quoted above, introduced his concept of social action into sociology, and thus opened a 
new field of sociological studies. But he still was not really concerned with communica-
tion in its entirety, as he again understood communication not as the basic activity of 
human beings (Weber, 1978). Instead, for example, he demanded studies about mass 
communication and democracy, which typically in the 19th century (and in part still 
today) understood communication only as a means of transporting concepts, and that 
were considered to be more important (cf. Ritzer & Goodman, 2004). In the same way, 
behaviourism and the measurement methodology that emerged in the first half of the 
20th century had no real sensibility for the fragile and tentative character of speaking, 
understanding  and  answering:  When  one  understands  conversation between  two  or 
more human beings as the basic form of communication, then it is evident that commu-
nication is a sequence of acts that depends on cultural, social and situational contexts, 
on empathy and understanding, on impression and expression, as can be seen for ex-
ample, in the work of Erving Goffman (1971). The relations between participants and 
their activities thus are not causal, but interactional; what happens is always fragile and 
tentative, and each such conversation develops by explaining and understanding things 
better in an ongoing process. This cannot be theoretically understood or empirically 
grasped by only searching for causal relations between the different contributions, by 
only constructing motives that last longer than the situation, or by ignoring the inner 
reality of the participants. 
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This character of communication did not become a topic of sociology before the 
work of pragmatic sociologist George Herbert Mead. He understood communication as 
a form of symbolic interaction (Mead, 1969, 1973). In his theory, what is true for sym-
bolic interaction is also true for communication. In particular, Mead was the first soci-
ologist who studied communication and interaction in two complementary ways:  He 
analysed communication as a form of social  action with consequences for the parti-
cipants, the situation, society and culture. And, he also tried to find out what the condi-
tions and presuppositions for communication are—not only, what people must be able 
to do, but also, how they must construct themselves in the process of growing up to be 
able to communicate in a specific human way. By doing so, he showed us that commu-
nication is relevant for humans in order to become human and how this happens and 
that communication creates the human beings as they are: communication as a social 
practice demands from the participants consciousness of the situation, the other parti-
cipants and of their own intentions (Krotz, 2007a). Thus, for example, self-conscious-
ness is also a specific communication based human feature—and evidently such self-
consciousness  is  a  prerequisite  for  dealing with symbols  and  constructing meaning. 
Thus, to communicate also produces such human features, and this makes human beings 
human.
It is thus no accident that besides Ferdinand de Saussure (1967), the second great se-
miotic approach comes from Charles Sanders Peirce (1998), who, like Mead, also be-
longs to American pragmatism—together they created a new understanding of signs, 
language and speaking and thus prepared the way for what was later called the symbolic 
turn in social and human sciences. 
A sociological  theorist  who  developed  theories  rather  compatible  with  those  of 
Mead was Alfred Schütz with his phenomenological sociology (1971) and his followers 
Berger & Luckmann (1980). Also worth mentioning here are Karl Mannheim (1980) 
and other sociologists of knowledge; for example,  Norbert Elias (1972, 1993, 1994) 
who referred to Mannheim's ideas. Altogether they have a unique position because they 
start with the importance of the symbolic and the concept of the meaning of symbols. 
For example, in his later work Norbert Elias (1989) developed a theory of the symbolic 
and thus started studies in communication. In his view, human beings live in a five di-
mensional reality—three spatial dimensions, time, and their embedding in the symbolic 
world, without which they cannot act. Thus, not the material objects are the basis of hu-
man action and of what happens,1 but the shared meaning of symbols that are construc-
ted by human practices, which leads to a much more realistic concept of materialism, as 
all objects have not only a material realisation, but are also symbols for specific prac-
tices—this is the basis of Blumer's definition of symbolic interactionism (cf. Blumer, 
1973). 
Concerning Marxism, thinkers like Antonio Gramsci (1991) at least searched for 
new ideas to overcome the strict linear relation and dependence between the material 
world and a derived ideology (and the symbolic world) and also the assumption that 
consciousness strictly follows class position. Later also the Frankfurt school, the French 
structuralists and British cultural studies, especially Stuart Hall argued likewise. In this 
line, finally Jürgen Habermas (1987, see also his early work of 1990) must be men-
tioned, who in his theory of communicative action tries to bring Mead and Marx and 
other theoretical authors together and developed the foundations of a sociology that is 
based on communicative action.
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But it cannot be said that the theories mentioned define the central paradigm in soci-
ology of today (cf. Ritzer & Goodman, 2004). Sociology is still a discipline that oper-
ates in a complex multitude of approaches, but it is not centrally based on a sociology of 
language and communication or on a symbol theory. There is also no real dialectical 
theory of the relations between thinking, speaking and acting, as would be necessary. 
The studies and theories mentioned are in part very interesting, but more or less in the 
margin of sociology today, as can be seen reading an introductory book into sociology 
(e.g., Ritzer & Goodman, 2004). We thus conclude that the image of the human being in 
sociology is still that of the being who can work and transforms nature in a collective 
way because such a transformation is necessary as a basis for living, and this is a rather 
different view of the human than that of communication science.
3.5 The humans living in media rich societies as seen by 
communication science
Of course we must say that sociology developed a lot of theories and ideas helpful for 
communication science. Communication science should in general be seen as a cross-
sectional discipline sharing a lot of theories and approaches with psychology, political 
science, media studies, and other disciplines. A lot of fundamental theories are derived 
from sociology: symbolic interactionism, the work of Habermas (1987), Luhmann's sys-
tem theory (Luhmann, 2006), the cultural industry theory of Horkheimer and Adorno 
(1971), Goffman's (1971) interaction studies, for example. Also, research methodology 
and most research methods of communication science as a social science stem from so-
ciology (cf. Krotz, 2005). Thus, there is an important connection between sociology and 
communication science, although they are very different from one another, as we can 
see when comparing their basic views of human beings. We described the image of hu-
mans in sociology above as the natural being producing the material basis of its life by 
transforming nature. In communication science, the starting point instead is the human 
being as the only being that has a complex language and uses a complex system of sym-
bols, and the only being that needs such a complex symbol system and depends on its 
use. It is the use of symbols and the production of meaning that makes humans a species 
of its own, and thus symbol production and use is basic for any theory of communica-
tion—the human being is the one and only being that is a symbolic being. At the same 
time, this means that logically semiotics are basic for any communication science that 
wants to understand human existence in a broader way than  just media use. 
In addition, when we look carefully at the history of sociology and communication 
science, we can see that communication in the frames of each of these two disciplines is 
very differently understood. Sociology must learn that an understanding of communica-
tion just as a means is not enough to reconstruct society theoretically and to understand 
the forms of human living together—instead, communication as a basic activity of hu-
mans that are understood as symbolic beings must be seen as an independent area of hu-
man  activity.  Communication  science  must  learn  that  communication  is  not  just  a 
measurable happening between people, a transportation of information or more or less 
automatic behaviour, but a fundamental human practice that creates the human beings as 
human beings. As we live in a web of meaning, as Clifford Geertz put it (1991), the 
‘symbolic’ needs more attention in communication science, as this symbolic refers to 
sense and meaning as it was understood by Max Weber and George Herbert Mead, as 
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quoted above. Consequently, communication and media use must be seen as a form of 
social action in the sense of symbolic interactionism as this defines a core reference sys-
tem of communication science. At the same time it defines the main difference between 
sociology and communication science, as communication science is concerned with the 
production, the use and the necessity of the symbolic by and for human beings, which is 
not the main topic of sociology. Nevertheless, both disciplines are complementary and 
interwoven.
When we refer to such a conversational based understanding of communication—
which means that human face-to-face-communication as conversation is the basic form 
of communication—and when we refer to communication and media use as social ac-
tion and to the symbolic interactionist concept of communication as sketched above, we 
have a broad basis for developing a theory of communication and media today in media 
rich societies. This is because on this basis we can argue that all other forms of commu-
nication should be understood as  modified forms of  face-to-face-communication,  an 
idea  that  was  started  by the  concept  of  parasocial  interaction  by Horton  and  Wohl 
(1956) and Horton and Strauss (1957). When one reads their articles carefully, it be-
comes evident that they understand media related communication as a modification of 
interpersonal  face-to-face-communication—mass  communication,  and  more  general 
media related communication is for them communication ‘as if’, which means it is sim-
ilar to face-to-face-communication, but also different. Using the assumption of modific-
ation  we  can  transform  our  knowledge  from  face-to-face-communication  to  media 
related  communication  and  also  from the  analysis  of  mediated  communication  into 
knowledge  about  face-to-face-communication,  of  course,  while  retaining  the  funda-
mental differences. Horton and Strauss and Horton and Wohl thus provided us with a 
concept for understanding media development as a long term evolution, which consists 
in a differentiation process of communication. 
Even in the media rich societies of today, each individual experiences and learns 
communication as an individual action. It takes place in a specific face-to-face-situation, 
there are spoken or otherwise symbolised messages, and every message is intentionally 
produced by one of the participant actors or at least it is assumed that this is the case, 
when a person tries to understand what he or she thinks to be an intentionally produced 
symbol. In general, all participating actors try to understand the produced message and 
the intentions behind it in order to produce an answer or to react in another way thereto. 
Today, besides the elementary form of face-to-face-communication, there exist three 
different types of media related communication, when one differentiates according to 
whom a person communicates, and each type consists of a lot of different forms of com-
munication: 
• Communication may take place one-sidedly, with reference to an object and with no 
one expecting an answer—this is the case when one writes or reads a book, produces 
and reads radio or television or in general in the case of mass communication. Here 
we speak of human communication with a standardised message that is addressed to 
an unspecified audience.  The communicator  then produces  the message,  and the 
audience activity is usually called media reception.
• Communication may take place when the message is produced by a machine like a 
robot or a software program in a computer, as is, for example, the case when a per-
son plays a computer game. The difference with mass communication is that it may 
be individually addressed and gives a specific answer to a preceding message. In this 
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case we speak of interactive communication with an ‘intelligent machine’ that al-
ways gives more or less individual answers.  
• Communication may take place between two or more human beings who address 
each other personally, but the message is transported over time and space by media, 
as is the case by telephone or letter.
All these types are modifications of face-to-face-communication, and they should be 
conceptualized according to Renckstorf (1989) as social action: Communication under-
stood as social action is central for any understanding of what communication is and 
may be, and for any empirical research and any theory of communication. This enables 
us to devise a complex understanding of communication that fits to symbolic interac-
tionism, to the semiotic and cultural studies and is adequate for the mediated societies 
and cultures of today. 
To sum up: Communication science has its own image of human beings; the human 
being here appears as the only being that uses and needs complex symbol systems for 
communication, thinking, producing and living in general. This makes communication 
science a sibling of sociology (and, of course, also a sibling of other disciplines). Be-
cause of this basic view of the human being, communication is fundamental for any so-
cial theory, and media must be understood as instruments that modify communication—
they transform communication into media production or media reception, mediated in-
terpersonal communication or into interactive communication. This understanding gives 
us the basic concept for a broad theory of communication and media use, especially in 
mediatised societies in which all human areas of life and experience are intertwined 
with media (Krotz,  2001 2007a;  Lundby,  2009).  Nevertheless,  what  we know about 
communication as social action today is by far not enough, and thus the discussion on 
these questions must go on, as we will sketch finally in the last section.
3.6 Some open questions about communication in mediatised 
societies
In this final section of this chapter we want to name some problems that make it evident 
that communication science must revitalise the problems of what communication is as 
social action. These problems are connected to the perspectives we have developed in 
the text above and thus show a direction in which research can and should go on. 
A first problem about communication in mediatised societies stems from the actual 
and rapid change of communication, for example, by the Internet, by mobile phones and 
all other media: What happens to socialisation and children's growing up, how do we 
live together, what happens with culture, society, the economy, democracy and civil so-
ciety, with everyday life and social relations? This is relevant for communication sci-
ence,  as this is a discipline with also practical goals. For example, we do not know 
enough about interactive communication. In addition, most of the empirical studies of 
communication science are still  one-medium studies.  As said above,  an approach to 
communication and media use as social action supplies us with a broad approach to 
study these developments (Lundby, 2009; Krotz, 2007b, 2009). 
Cultural studies are the source of a second problem. We argued above that communi-
cation as found in traditional communication science is regarded as reproducing an in-
stitutional and media centered view. Cultural studies reacted by creating its own view—
that social and cultural reality is the relevant starting point of theory and empirical re-
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search, and not the media. This can be seen in the work of Ien Ang, David Morley or 
that of Stuart Hall and all others who did not follow this institutional perspective of 
people as audience or target (for an overview, see Hepp, Krotz & Thomas, 2009). Here, 
a broad social action approach may be a good basis for further theoretical development. 
A third problem lies in the methodology. As Renckstorf already noted in 1989, com-
munication research still has a behaviourist bias. As we said above, an action theoretical 
approach should refer to symbolic interactionism and semiotics, and this means that we 
must use qualitative research methods. The central category of research is not the mean 
value or the deviance of quantitative data, but a sequence of case studies taking into ac-
count the sense and meaning of whatever happens, from the perspective of the single 
analysed person, following an intelligent theoretical sampling based on grounded theory 
(Krotz, 2005). Of course, there are research questions that should be answered by using 
quantitative methodology, for example, percentages of how much people view a pro-
gramme and things like that. But most theoretically interesting research will refer to an-
other type of data and starts with understanding what people do and why. 
Fourthly,  there  is  a  problem coming from the  history of  communication,  which 
should not be confused with and reduced to the history of the media system or the his-
tory of language. We still do not have any understanding of the historical dependence of 
communication today,  as  was  mentioned  above when we discussed  the  relationship 
between sociology and communications. Saying ‘I’ today is different from saying ‘I’ in 
the Middle Ages, in a society with slavery or in a highly religious culture. The nature of 
a joke and how we laugh about it today is different to jokes in other times and cultures. 
Saying a sentence today is not the same as saying the same sentence a century or a mil-
lennium ago or will be in the future: We do not have a socio-historical theory of com-
munication. We even do not have a history of media with reference to their role and 
meaning to society, as can be seen when one refers to medium theory (Meyrowitz, 1990, 
1995, 1997; McLuhan, 1967; Innis, 1950, 1951; and others). But we need a broad his-
torical understanding of media and communication development when we want to un-
derstand in which direction media, communication and thus our culture and society are 
developing (and not only a media history). 
In sum, the direct route from action theoretical questions to theoretical and empirical 
answers to these questions is to go on with such a discussion and to learn from symbolic 
interactionism. This does not mean that the paradigm of communication science is sym-
bolic interactionism. But it means that communication science can learn from the sym-
bolic interactionist approach to communication and that it should do so. The first step 
was the action theoretical turn in the last century, now we must go further.
Notes
1 I want to emphasise that this does not mean that a materialistic perspective on the 
social is wrong. But it remains mechanical if it does not take into account that the 
human being lives in a symbolically given world.
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